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This paper explores the interaction between a prominent board of directors and the network of inter-ﬁrm rela-
tionships on new product development. Speciﬁcally, we posit a positive interaction effect between a prominent
board and the inter-ﬁrmnetwork and structural holes positions on the number of newproducts developed by the
ﬁrm. We test the theoretical framework on a sample of 1758 agreements among 1890 biopharmaceutical ﬁrms
over the period 2006–2010.We ﬁnd that by ﬁltering, complementing and legitimizing information coming from
the inter-ﬁrm network, a prominent interlocking directorate network can improve the inter-ﬁrm network's
effects on new product development. We discuss important implications for how inter-personal networks
(such as the board interlock directorate network) help to develop the effectiveness of inter-ﬁrm relationship
networks in achieving new product development outcomes.
© 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Whilst we now understand more about how individual networks
impact the ﬁrm's performance, a recent trend in network research has
shifted to investigating network effects on business outcomes across
multiple networks (Ozmel et al., 2013). More speciﬁcally, management
literature has investigated—independently—the impact of inter-personal
networks, such as the interlocking directorate networks, and the inter-
ﬁrm relationship networks on ﬁrm performance. Interlocking directorate
networks act as an inter-personal channel by which information and
knowledge resources are exchanged (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) to the
beneﬁt of the ﬁrm. Literature in this ﬁeld has mainly focused on examin-
ing how the interlocking directorate networks affect economic and ﬁnan-
cial performance (Dalton et al., 1999; Peng and Luo, 2000; Non and
Franses, 2007; Pombo and Gutiérrez, 2011; Horton et al., 2012; Croci
and Grassi, 2013; Larcker et al., 2013; Li et al., 2013; Kaczmarek et al.,
2014), enhance superior innovation performance (Wincent et al.,
2010), inﬂuence strategic alliance formation (Gulati and Westphal,
1999), contribute to the strategic decision making process
(Carpenter and Westphal, 2001), and ﬁnally foster internal innova-
tion or external innovation (Hoskisson et al., 2002). Similarly, a lot of re-
search has highlighted the importance of inter-ﬁrm network structural
positions on theﬁrm's performance. Indeed, according to social capital lit-
erature, the inter-ﬁrm network is itself a source of valuable resources
through which the ﬁrm can improve its performance (Ahuja, 2000;
Koka and Prescott, 2002; Soh, 2003; Salman and Saives, 2005; Zaheer
and Bell, 2005; Maurer and Ebers, 2006; Acquaah, 2007; Schilling and
Phelps, 2007; Wu, 2008; Gilsing et al., 2008; Padula, 2008;
Vanhaverbeke et al., 2009; Phelps, 2010; Malik, 2011; Vanhaverbeke
et al., 2012).
However, it remains unresolved how the beneﬁts delivered through
inter-personal networks can be channeled to improve the delivery of
business outcomes in inter-ﬁrm level networks. A possible exception
in literature is Wang et al. (2014). The study by Wang et al. (2014) in-
vestigates two different networks, i.e. social networks of researchers
and networks of knowledge elements and their relation to the ﬁrm's
propensity to patent. This study examines the impact of two different
inter-personal networks (social network and knowledge network) on
innovative performance.
Our study investigates the interaction effect of an important inter-
personal network (interlocking directorate) and inter-ﬁrm network
(inter-ﬁrm ties such as alliances) on the ﬁrm's innovative performance.
To the best of our knowledge, no studies so far have investigated the in-
teraction effect of these two kinds of networks on ﬁrm's innovation
performance.
In exploring this issue we build on the notion of structural network
position as the source of advantageous beneﬁts such as information
sources and exchange of knowledge and resources (Koka and Prescott,
2002). Butwe also note that advantageous structural network positions,
such as prominent and structural hole positions, have possible draw-
backs such as information redundancy (in the case of prominence)
and lack of specialization and focus (in the case of structural holes)
(Ahuja, 2000; Vanhaverbeke et al., 2009;Malik, 2011). These drawbacks
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limit the full potential of any positive impact that the aforementioned
network positions have on the ﬁrm's innovation performance. Our intu-
ition is that ﬁrms with two prominent networks can use the beneﬁts
derived from one network to counterweigh the drawbacks in another
network and so realize full business outcomes. In our study, we argue
that a ﬁrm having a prominent inter-personal network position (i.e.
the interlockingdirectorate network) achieved throughextensive direct
and indirect board ties, can use information assets at its disposal at the
board level to reduce potential drawbacks encountered in the ﬁrm's
inter-ﬁrm network by ﬁltering, complementing and legitimizing infor-
mation that is used by the ﬁrm to achieve innovation outcomes
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003).
Thus, our research contributes to the recent social capital (SC) liter-
ature trend that explores multiple network effects on business out-
comes (e.g. Ozmel et al., 2013) by developing a theoretical argument
of how an inter-personal network (the board interlock directorate
network) inter-acts with an inter-ﬁrm network (such as alliances) to
enhance innovation outcomes. In addition, we empirically validate this
framework.
In this study we speciﬁcally focus on new product development
(NPD) performance as a measure of innovation outcome, because of
its importance in our research context—the biopharmaceutical industry.
Past research in this industry has consideredNPD as a good proxy of inno-
vation outcomes because developing new products provides successful
ﬁrms with monopoly rents for 10–15 years (Rothaermel, 2001; George
et al., 2001; Rothaermel, 2002; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004; Lim et al.,
2006). Hence, in the biopharmaceutical industry, NPD is increasingly a
focal point of competition and often requires the development and suc-
cessful implementation of novel process technologies that ensures ﬁrms
achieve their ultimately economic objectives such as cash, market share
and competitive advantages (LiebermanandMontgomery, 1998). As a re-
sult NPD has been considered a key variable in alliance studies and has
been utilized to address the impact of alliances in the innovation perfor-
mance of the ﬁrm (Rothaermel, 2001; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004;
Faems et al., 2005; Perks and Jeffery, 2006; Nieto and Santamaria,
2007). However, despite its importance in the biopharmaceutical indus-
try and its relevance in alliance literature, past studies employing network
theory to link network structural dimensions to innovation outcomes
have mostly neglected NPD as a dependent variable by concentrating
more on patents as the measure of innovation performance (Ahuja,
2000; Salman and Saives, 2005; Schilling and Phelps, 2007; Gilsing
et al., 2008; Padula, 2008; Vanhaverbeke et al., 2009; Phelps, 2010;
Karamanos, 2012; Vanhaverbeke et al., 2012). An important exception
is the recent study of Mazzola et al. (2015), in which the authors hypoth-
esize a positive effect of some structural embeddedness network posi-
tions of the ﬁrm in its inter-ﬁrm networks on ﬁrm's NPD performance
in the biopharmaceutical industry. The paper's empirical analysis shows
that a prominent position of the ﬁrm in its network positively affects
NPD performance, while structural hole positions seem to not effect
NPD performance. Similarly, Wincent et al. (2010) show how high levels
of board interlocking directorates have positive effects on innovation
performance related to new product development. These recent studies
enforce the importance of the contribution of this research. Indeed,
while literature has acknowledged the relevance of inter-personal and
inter-ﬁrm networks on improving NPD performance, no studies have fo-
cused on the interaction effects of these two networks like we do in this
paper.
We test our theoretical framework on a set of 300 public companies
in the biopharmaceutical industry andwe get a positive conﬁrmation of
our hypotheses. Indeed, our results show how a prominent position of
the ﬁrm's board in the directorates network reinforces the positive im-
pact on NPD performance that prominent and structural hole positions
in the ﬁrm's inter-organizational network have on the same perfor-
mance variable.
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we develop
the theoretical framework and a set of hypotheses. Section 3 discusses
the research methodology and the dataset, and section 4 presents the
model speciﬁcation. In section 5 results of the empirical investigations
are shown, while discussion about the contribution of this research
and conclusions are presented in section 6.
2. Theory and hypotheses
In recent decades, SC theorists have elucidated why network beneﬁts
arise from the ﬁrm's structural positions—both theoretically and empiri-
cally. Aﬁrm can beneﬁt from its network by accessing critical information
in the network through multiple ties with many partners, i.e. through
prominent positions (Koka and Prescott, 2008). First, ﬁrms pursuing
prominence in the network have advantages arising from accessing key
and valuable information available in the network. Indeed, a prominent
position facilitates the exchange of a high volume of information and
knowledge assets that the ﬁrm can use to its competitive advantage
(Granovetter, 1973; Koka and Prescott, 2002). However, network prom-
inence beneﬁts go beyond access to include those based on afﬁliation;
indeed such a position enables the ﬁrm to inﬂuence its partners in
ways that enable it to pursue and establish its own strategic agenda,
thus enhancing its own performance (Koka and Prescott, 2008). As
Podolny (2001) points out, being included in several inter-ﬁrm relations
is also a signaling device that denotes prominence and inﬂuence
(Zamudio et al., 2014) and signals quality and status (Ozmel et al., 2013).
A prominent position depends on the prominence of ﬁrms connected
to it (Ruhnau, 2000; Koka and Prescott, 2002; Koka and Prescott, 2008;
Zamudio, et al., 2014). Prominent ﬁrms in networks beneﬁt from
accessing potentially valuable external information from all companies
other than its immediate partners (Soh, 2003), from developing greater
capacity tomonitor their external environment and fromﬁnding new in-
formation and knowledge (Ahuja, 2000). Most of the empirical studies
that examine the impact of network prominent positions employ a
range of ﬁrm's innovation output types as the dependent variable.
These studies include the positive predictions of network prominence
on patenting frequency (Ahuja, 2000), number of product awards (Soh,
2003), patenting propensity (Salman and Saives, 2005), innovative out-
put (Schilling and Phelps, 2007), non-core technology patent citations
(Vanhaverbeke et al., 2012), and new product development (Mazzola
et al., 2015). Indeed, the ﬁrm's prominence in its own industry has been
positively associated with higher exploitative and explorative learning
processes (Atuahene-Gima and Murray, 2007) that are acknowledged
as highly inﬂuential in product development (Katila and Ahuja, 2002).
Prominent ﬁrms develop capabilities in dealing with inter-ﬁrm relation-
ships (Anand and Khanna, 2000; Kale and Singh, 2007; Wang and Zajac,
2007) that can be useful to improve collaborative product development
processes. In addition, prominent ﬁrms, thanks to their reputation and
status, can ﬁrstly and easily reach the most inﬂuential suppliers and
hence access the best knowledge and capabilities for making the NPD
process more successful (Primo and Amundson, 2002; Petersen et al.,
2003; Ragatz et al., 2003; Oke et al., 2008; Mazzola and Perrone, 2013);
ﬁnally, thanks to their experience and knowledge about the network,
they can better select the most aligned patents or technologies that can
trigger or strengthen the NPD process (Geum et al., 2013).
Structural holes represent the second key structural network posi-
tion that affects the ﬁrm's innovation performance (Burt, 1992; Ahuja,
2000; Burt, 2004; Zaheer and Bell, 2005; Padula, 2008). Structural
holes are gaps in information ﬂows created when two unrelated
ﬁrms are linked to the same ego ﬁrm but not to each other. The ﬁrm
that bridges unconnected ﬁrms will be able to potentially access novel
and diverse information thatmight positively affect theﬁrm's innovation
performance (Burt, 1992, 2004; Koka and Prescott, 2002). Structural
holes provide connections with so-called weak ties which may be part-
ners operating in different industries, markets or technologies (Gilsing
and Nooteboom, 2005) or just simply diverse and non-redundant infor-
mation from partners that help companies to increase the innovation
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performance (Ahuja, 2000; Koka and Prescott, 2002; Rothaermael and
Deeds, 2004; Gilsing et al., 2008).
Empirical research on structural holes and their impact on innova-
tion outcomes has produced mixed results that seem to depend on
the type of innovation performance investigated. For example, Ahuja
(2000) ﬁnds a negative relationship between bridging structural holes
and the ability of the ﬁrm to develop new patents, while Padula
(2008) ﬁnds that a ﬁrm occupying a position that bridges network clus-
ters is able to improve its patent propensity. With regards to research
that employs NPD as dependent variable, previous literature recognizes
that structural holes may facilitate the development of new products
(Mazzola et al., 2015). Structural holes provide connectionswith unusual
ties operating in different industries, markets or technologies and access
to diverse andnon-redundant information that help companies to devel-
op new ideas and technologies for developing new products (Hargadon
and Sutton, 1997; Zaheer and Bell, 2005). For example, Hargadon and
Sutton (1997) describe a process of brainstorming in which IDEO's
employees use technological solutions from one industry to solve client
issues in their own industry where the solutions are rare or unknown.
IDEO's employees, act as technology brokers in different industries to im-
prove the ﬁrm's likelihood of developing new products. Following such
reasoning, Mazzola et al. (2015) hypothesize a positive inﬂuence of
structural hole positions, in a network of inter-ﬁrm relationships, on
ﬁrm's NPD performance. Through an empirical analysis they found that
bridging structural holes does not seem to inﬂuence ﬁrm's NPD perfor-
mance. In summary, mixed empirical results from past studies on the
link between structural hole positions and product innovation may
therefore point to the presence of an interacting factor, a gap that our
study seeks to explore.
2.1. The interaction of the board's prominence with the inter-ﬁrm network
positions
The interlocking directorate network and the inter-ﬁrm network are
two important networks that have individually a positive effect on the
innovation performance of the ﬁrm.
Regarding the interlocking directorate network, literature on the
board function outlines how the ﬁrm's board members are themselves
providers of resources to the ﬁrm—reputation or prominence being one
such key resource (Hillman and Daziel, 2003). In the resource provision
function, the board provides advice and counsel on important matters
such as strategy formulation, access to information from outside the
ﬁrm, preferential access to valuable resources that may be obtained
through the board members' personal contacts, skills and expertise
and legitimacy (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Each board director has an
individual interlock directorate network that is the sum of the actual
and potential resources embeddedwithin, available through, and derived
from the network of (direct and indirect) relationships possessed by the
director as a result of sitting on boards of other companies. The SC aspects
of the board, in its resource provision function, are obtained by aggregat-
ing the individual director SC to the board level (Haynes and Hillman,
2010). Given that information obtained through the board network
affects other networks through suchmechanisms as strategy formulation
or provision of expert opinion by boardmembers, to get amore complete
understanding of the determinants of the ﬁrm's innovation performance,
we need to investigate what board networks bring to the ﬁrm and how
they interact with the ﬁrm's other key networks such as its inter-ﬁrm
network and the effect of this interaction on the ﬁrm's frequency to
develop new products.
Several scholars have established the importance of a prominent
board on the ﬁrm's economic-ﬁnancial performance broadly (Non and
Franses, 2007; Horton et al., 2012; Croci and Grassi, 2013; Larcker et al.,
2013; Li et al., 2013) and on NPD, in particular (Wincent et al., 2010).
Germane to this study, a prominent board positively inﬂuences both
the ﬁrms' process and product innovation (Wincent et al., 2010). In
appointing boardmembers, ﬁrms therefore pay attention to the resource
provision function of the board and aim to enhance the board and there-
fore the ﬁrm's SC by appointing experienced executives with a track re-
cord and reputation within their industry (Haynes and Hillman, 2010).
To achieve prominence in the interlock directorate network, ﬁrms ap-
pointmemberswho sit on boards of other reputable companies thus pro-
viding the focal ﬁrm board with direct and indirect beneﬁts of
information and knowledge access. Theweb of relationships in the inter-
lock directorate network facilitates the exchange of ﬁne grained informa-
tion about the industry trends and strategies that would be of beneﬁt to
ﬁrms considering entering into ormanaging strategic inter-ﬁrm relation-
ships. A directors' prominence and therefore the extant of information
and knowledge beneﬁts arising from their network, depend on the
boards they sit on directly, and also on third party links through other
co-directors. Therefore, the boards on which prominent directors sit on,
achieve prominent positions in the interlock directorate network and
are perceived to be of high quality (Haynes and Hillman, 2010). Summa-
rizing, a ﬁrm with a prominent board is a ﬁrm whose directors are on
average highly connected with other ﬁrms and, therefore are well in-
formed about technology and market trends, opportunities and threats.
Furthermore, such directors have vast experience in board decision-
making issues and have solid reputations, so that they are likely to act
more independently from the ﬁrm's management since they are careful
to make decisions that do not alter their own reputations.
At the same time we know that having a prominent position in the
inter-ﬁrm network involves managers dealing with more speciﬁc and
operative information. Indeed, although inter-ﬁrm agreements are
often decided at board level, the execution of such agreements allows
product managers to exchange speciﬁc information concerning thera-
peutic areas, technologies, intermediate products (such as genes and
proteins), patents and manufacturing processes. Although such infor-
mation is broadly advantageous for NPD (Mazzola et al., 2015), there
are some possible drawbacks (Vanhaverbeke et al., 2009; Malik, 2011)
mainly related to high volumes of information to be processed and ex-
cessive information specialization (Koka and Prescott, 2002). Processing
high volumes of information might have adverse consequences when it
is necessary to make fast decisions such as in NPD process contexts
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Such adverse consequences might arise from the
necessity to scan high information volumes resulting from being promi-
nent and the need to ﬁlter redundant information, certify information
ﬂows as trustworthy and of high quality and suitable for the NPD process
(Koka and Prescott, 2002). Finally, there is a tendency for excessive infor-
mation specialization in ﬁrms with highly prominent positions in the
inter-ﬁrm relationship network, which can limit the scope for the explo-
ration of newmarkets and new solutions that often are required to devel-
op new products (Sammarra and Biggiero, 2008; Vanhaverbeke et al.,
2009; Malik, 2011).
We argue that a prominent board counterweighs such drawbacks
when they occur in inter-ﬁrm networks by improving the effectiveness
of information obtained in structural inter-ﬁrm network positions.
Indeed,while occupying a prominent position in the inter-ﬁrm network
allows product managers to acquire speciﬁc knowledge and informa-
tion that are closely related to product development (Dyer and Singh,
1998; Gulati, 1999; Gulati et al., 2000; Koka and Prescott, 2002), board
prominence, being related to board directors, mainly concerns wide
and deep industrial knowledge. Board directors are therefore able to
help the management of the ﬁrm to ﬁlter redundant information and
certify incoming knowledge as legitimate and potentially useful for
NPD. Indeed, prominent directors are more knowledgeable about tech-
nology and market trends in the industry which are needed to develop
new products (Mizruchi, 1996). For example, in the biopharmaceutical
sector, prominent directors are more likely to be well-informed about
the latest technology trends, themost promisingpatents in the industry,
or the new approaches in drug discovery other companies are investing
in. Thus, a prominent board, functioning as a ﬁltering mechanism,
reduces the cost of ﬁnding useful information from the redundancy pro-
vided by the ﬁrm's prominence in the inter-ﬁrm ties network. Also,
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thanks to prominent directors, product development teams are able to
focus on a set of shared knowledge and similar capabilities that enhance
the speed of NPD (Rindﬂeisch and Moorman, 2001). Furthermore,
prominent directors help in certifying information as legitimate for
NPD. Indeed, we can expect prominent directors to take great care in
evaluating board proposals because their own personal reputation is
at risk (Podolny, 2001). Because prominent boards aremade up of exec-
utives with a successful track record and status (Ozmel et al., 2013),
they are careful not to be associatedwith bad decisions that can damage
their own reputation. Such directors are in a good position to better
evaluate objectively the reliability, the accuracy and the quality of infor-
mation from inter-ﬁrm network sources. In doing so, prominent direc-
tors act as knowledge brokers that certify the available information
that enhances NPD processes of the ﬁrm (Hargadon, 1998).
Furthermore, it is highly likely that prominent directors' experiences
and connections span different industries from those tied directly or in-
directly to the focal ﬁrm. Thus, prominent directors are a possible source
of additional information that reduces the risk of excessive information
specialization and allows the focal ﬁrm to better explore new markets
and technologies and ultimately to improve its NPD processes (Katila
and Ahuja, 2002). Finally, prominent directors are likely to use knowl-
edge structures developed from their experience on other boards for
speeding up decision-making processes and, particularly, new product
development initiatives (Carpenter and Westphal, 2001). For instance,
Useem (1982) observed that executives use their board appointments
as a way to scan the environment for timely and pertinent information.
Similarly, directors can learn about the efﬁcacy of different practices and
how to implement them properly by observing the consequences of
management decisions (Haunschild, 1993).
Hence, from the foregoing we can posit that:
H1. The interaction between a prominent board in the interlocking
directorate network and a prominent position in its inter-ﬁrm relation-
ship network is positively related to new product development.
A ﬁrm that bridges structural holes is able to access potentially novel
and diverse information from remote parts of its network that can en-
hance the ﬁrm's performance (Burt, 1992; McEvily and Zaheer, 1999).
Nevertheless, information obtained from bridging structural holes is
often distant and diverse from the core business of the ﬁrm. So, in
such cases, searching for valuable information through structural holes
may actually reduce rather enhance the propensity of the ﬁrm to develop
new products. In addition to the challenge of dealing with many non-
redundant andweak ties, ﬁrmsmay also have to handle diverse informa-
tion effectively (Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001). Most focal ﬁrms are
limited in their ability to recognize, assimilate, transform, and exploit dis-
tant and diverse knowledge for effective product development (Cohen
and Levinthal, 1990). Such limits result in excess information that lead
to dis-economies of scale in their innovation effort (Shipilov, 2009).
Moreover, when knowledge components become more diverse, the
lack of specialization and focus makes the recombination of this knowl-
edge into new valuable ideas difﬁcult—thus potentially decreasing the
product development rate (Brusoni et al., 2001).
We argue that having prominent directors may help the focal ﬁrm
deal with the possible drawbacks of inter-ﬁrm structural hole positions.
Indeed, prominent boards—made up of prominent directors—act as
channels of potentially valuable information to the focal ﬁrm that miti-
gate the impact of these drawbacks in two ways: ﬁrstly, counteracting
the aforementioned drawbacks, and secondly adding complementary
information. The counteracting effect happens in three ways. First,
prominent directors can reduce the information asymmetry between
distant ties in the inter-ﬁrmnetwork. Prominent directors act as compe-
tent interpreters of information that is far from the core business of the
ﬁrm and thus help the management to better understand and evaluate
any “distant” information for the purpose of developing new products.
Second, prominent directors help the focal ﬁrm to reduce the risk relat-
edwith distant information because such directors are likely to bemore
aware of possible threats or failures experienced by other ﬁrms when
dealing with “distant” information. Prominent directors can alert man-
agement of possible risks of failure involving certain NPD projects and
in this way help the ﬁrm to avoid high risk paths. Finally, as well
argued by Hoskisson et al. (2002), a director with a deeper knowledge
of the market, also for the reasons previously mentioned, perceives
less risk in product development projects and therefore is generally
more willing to adopt NPD strategies.
Additionally, prominent directors play a complementary role of pro-
viding the volume of information that is sometimesmissingwhen ﬁrms
bridge structural holes. Management can then have a mix of “close”
(from the directors) and “distant” (from the ﬁrm's structural hole posi-
tion) information. This combination means the ﬁrm has sufﬁcient
“search depth” and “search scope” processes that are well known to be
necessary for effective new product development (Katila and Ahuja,
2002).
In summary, a prominent board overcomes two limitations of the
structural hole position of the ﬁrm in improving product development:
ﬁrstly, a prominent board contributes by reducing search costs and risk
related with “distant” information absorption; secondly, the board
supplies information volume that the ﬁrm may not have or obtain from
bridging structural holes.
We, therefore, expect that:
H2. The interaction between a prominent board in the interlocking di-
rectorate network and a ﬁrm bridging structural hole position in its
inter-ﬁrm relationship network is positively related to the new product
development.
3. Research method
3.1. Sample and data
The research setting for this study is the biopharmaceutical industry.
We chose this context for a number of reasons. First, biopharmaceutical
companies are knowledge-based ﬁrms involved in complex R&D pro-
cesses (Salman and Saives, 2005). In addition, previous literature recog-
nizes this industry as an appropriate context for studying innovation
performance (Powell et al, 1996; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004). More-
over, the biopharmaceutical sector is characterized by long gestation
periods in product development, multiple stakeholders and complex in-
teractions among several parties that inﬂuence the innovation processes
(Rothaermel, 2001; McCutchen and Swamidass, 2004). From the ﬁrst
stage of the drug development process to commercialization, the bio-
pharmaceutical industry is characterized by an extensive use of inter-
ﬁrm agreements (Powell et al., 1996; Billitteri et al., 2013). The biophar-
maceutical industry has the highest absolute number of cooperative
agreements and accounts for 20% of all strategic alliances (Rothaermel,
2001) and is thus a relevant arena for studying inter-ﬁrm relationships.
We collected data frommultiple sources.We obtained data on inter-
ﬁrm collaborations from the BioWorld database, a comprehensive data-
base covering the global biopharmaceutical industry. BioWorld is used
in different studies (e.g. Birch, 2008). We retrieved data on NPD from
the “Biotech Products” section of the BioWorld database. The patenting
data is retrieved from the US Patents Ofﬁce database, while the director
data and all the ﬁrm-attribute data are obtained from the companies'
annual reports.
We built our database in several steps. The ﬁrst step consisted of
collecting records of inter-ﬁrm collaborations (inter-ﬁrm collaborations
in our study include: licencing agreements, acquisition/selling of R&D or
manufacturing services, R&D collaborations, minority equity agreements)
between biotech companies (by biotech we mean pure biotechnological
and biopharmaceutical) over the years 2006–2010. We obtained 1758
agreements from 1890 biotechnology ﬁrms. In the second step, following
past research in a similar research context (Stuart et al., 2007; Phelps,
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2010; Malik, 2011), we limited the sample frame to public companies to
ensure the availability and reliability of ﬁrm-attribute data. Then, from
the full dataset of 1890 companies, we conﬁned our sample to public
companies, speciﬁcally 544 ﬁrms. Sincewe selected all the public compa-
nies in the set of 1890 companies, no selection-bias canbe associatedwith
our sample. In the third step we matched the inter-ﬁrm collaborations
data to the directors data. This step resulted in a further reduction of the
sample for the following reasons. First, we included in our analysis only
those ﬁrms with a signiﬁcant board dimension. We therefore restricted
the sample to those ﬁrms withmore than 3 directors on their board. Sec-
ond,we excludedﬁrms thatwent public in the observation period (2006–
2010). Third, we excluded ﬁrms for which we did not have full informa-
tion about their directors' names. Using the above criteria we obtained a
ﬁnal sample of 300 public companies.
As for the interlocking director network,we obtained informationon
boards of directors of publicly held companies from the ﬁrms' annual re-
ports for the years 2006–2010. We constructed the director network
measure following an already applied methodology (Omer et al., 2013).
The total number of directors who served on the boards of the 300
ﬁrms in our sample during the 2006–2010 periods is 4323. We built an
annual matrix of director networks that mapped the connections be-
tween the different directors based on whether they sat on the same
company board. Thus, for each ﬁrm and each year in our sample, we ob-
tained data on the individual directorswho serve on the 300ﬁrm's board.
3.2. Measurements
3.2.1. Dependent variable
The dependent variable in this study is the newproduct development
rate of a biotech company.We focused onNPDdue to the following ratio-
nale. First, SC literature has speciﬁcally investigated the effect of network
positions on patenting propensity but disregarded examining the impact
of network positions on NPD. Moreover, in the biopharmaceutical con-
text, NPD is a direct measure of how well a ﬁrm performs within a new
technological paradigm in the ﬁnal market. Developing new products is
increasingly a focal point of competition and often requires the develop-
ment and successful implementation of novel process technologies
(Pisano, 1990). In the biopharmaceutical industry, introducing a
new drug in the market allows the ﬁrm to gain monopoly proﬁts for
10–15 years ensuring in this way cash, market share and getting repu-
tation (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1998). Several scholars within
this industry assume the number of new products developed as a mea-
sure of innovation performance (Rothaermel, 2001; Rothaermel and
Deeds, 2004; Kalaignanam et al., 2007; Bianchi et al., 2011). We opera-
tionalized the dependent variable by counting the number of new bio-
pharmaceutical products (New products) a biotech ﬁrm has introduced
into the market throughout 2010–2012.
Because numerous biotech companies may not have a new drug
marketed every year, a 3-years window for developing new products
attenuates annual ﬂuctuations and may capture a biopharmaceutical
ﬁrm's product development propensity more accurately. To assess dif-
ferent lag speciﬁcations between the explanatory variables (inter-ﬁrm
network positions and interlocking directorate network position) and
the dependent variable (new product development) we applied an
approach quite adopted in literature—the dependent variable consists
of observations over the 3 years (i.e. 2010–2012) following the
5 years of company-level agreement observations (2006–2010) (Bae
and Gargiulo, 2004; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004; Padula, 2008;
Phelps, 2010; Vanhaverbeke et al., 2012).
3.2.2. Independent variables
To best capture the notion of prominence in our theoretical frame-
work,we used eigenvector centrality because it is amore involvedmea-
sure that utilizes the intensity of the relationships to calculate centrality
(Bonacich, 1987; Ruhnau, 2000; Bonacich, 2007). We have chosen this
measure of centrality for several reasons. First, eigenvector centrality
considers both direct and indirect company ties, i.e. it accounts for the
case in which a company is highly central with only a few ties, but is
also connected to indirectly highly central ﬁrms within the network.
Second, eigenvector centrality is a goodmeasure of information volume
channelled to the ego ﬁrm both from direct and indirect ties (Koka and
Prescott, 2002). Third, eigenvector centrality has been associated with
status accumulation in a network—a key feature of prominent positions
(Shipilov and Li, 2008). Finally, in SC literature, this measure has been
often related to innovation performance (Ahuja, 2000; Salman and
Saives, 2005; Padula, 2008).
The second inter-ﬁrmnetwork structuremeasure seeks to assess the
extent to which a biopharmaceutical company does or does not bridge
structural holes (Str_holes). We assessed the presence or the absence
of structural holes in the overall network of ties among ﬁrms.We calcu-
lated this variable as one minus the ﬁrm's constraint score (in cases
where constraint was non-zero) and zero for all other cases, because a
score of zero in our network happens only when the ﬁrm is unconnect-
ed to others, so it has no access to structural holes. This measure of
structural holes is extensively used in SC literature (Zaheer and Bell,
2005).
In order to compute the eigenvector centrality and the structural
holes measures of each of the 300 ﬁrms, we used all the inter-ﬁrm col-
laborations within the full dataset, i.e. 1758 agreements. We recorded
each agreement in ﬁve binary n × n (one per observed years) adjacency
matrixes,At, where nt is the number of ﬁrms and t is the year within the
range 2006–2010. For eachmatrix, the termAtij is set to 1 if the company
i and company j signed an agreement in the year t, 0 otherwise. Then, by
using UCINET (Borgatti et al., 2002), a network analysis program that
computes network variables using dyadic data,we computed the eigen-
vector centrality (Eigent) and structural holes (Str_holest) for each ﬁrm
in the network at year t. We then computed the average value of eigen-
vector centrality (Eigen) and structural holes (Str_holes) for each of the
300 ﬁrms over the ﬁve years of observations (2006–2010).
With regards to the interlocking directorate network centrality mea-
sure, we selected the eigenvector centrality measure because it reﬂects
not only the number of direct links a given director has developed, but
also the number of links developed by the directors to whom the given
director is connected (Larcker et al., 2013; Li et al., 2013). Consequently,
the bigger the eigenvector centrality measure the larger the amount of
direct or indirect access and the potential quantity of information ﬂow
to or from a given director. Additionally, eigenvector centrality signals
the status of an individual in networks of social relationships (Ozmel et
al., 2013) a feature that, as previously explained, puts a director in a
good position to ﬁlter, assess and legitimize information coming from
the ﬁrm's network.
The interlocking directorate network of each of the 300 ﬁrms was
computed using the 4323 directors who serve on the boards of the
300 ﬁrms in the 2006–2010 period. We constructed ﬁve binary n × n
(one per observed years) adjacencymatrixes,Bt, where nt is the number
of directors and t is the year in the interval 2006–2010. For eachmatrix,
the term Btij is set to 1 if director i and director j sat on the same board in
the year t, 0 otherwise. Then, by using the software UCINETwe comput-
ed the eigenvector centrality for each director in the network at year t.
This measure is calculated at director level; this allows us to include
the inter-personal network of each individual director thus extending
the analysis beyond any speciﬁc board on which they may be seating
(Omer et al., 2013). Since our unit of analysis is the company, we com-
puted the eigenvector centrality of the ﬁrm's board by averaging the ei-
genvector centrality of all the directors sitting on each speciﬁc company
board. Thus, the variable Interlock_Eigent is the average (multiplied by
1000 for scaling reasons) of the eigenvalue centrality of the interlocks
of all the directors sitting on a companyboard for eachﬁrm at time t.Ad-
ditionally, since we work on a 5-year observation period, we computed
the average value of Interlock_Eigent over the ﬁve years of observations
(2006–2010), and we indicate this average as Interlock_Eigen. Finally,
since the variable Interlock_Eigen presents high levels of dispersion, we
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log-transformed the variable, and this actually improved the model
ﬁtting.
3.2.3. Control variables
We included several control variables thatmay impact the propensity
to develop new products. First of all, we controlled for the ﬁrm's innova-
tiveness by including a count variable of its patents received in the thirty
years prior to 2010 (patent stock).We also included the natural logarithm
of the average number of employees of each ﬁrm over the period 2006–
2010 as a proxy for ﬁrm size (Ahuja, 2000). R&D expenditures were
included as the natural logarithm of average R&D expenditures in the
years 2006–2010 (Bae and Gargiulo, 2004). We also controlled for
industry, a dummy variable that indicates whether a company is a
pure biotechnological or a biopharmaceutical one (Vanhaverbeke
et al., 2009; Billitteri et al., 2013). Finally, we included a dummyvariable
(nationality) to distinguish between US-based and non-US biotechnology
companies (1 = US ﬁrm) to control for nationality differences (Ahuja,
2000; Vanhaverbeke et al., 2012).
4. Model speciﬁcation
In this study the dependent variable, New products, is a ‘count’
variable, which takes only discrete nonnegative integer values, and
has possibly a large number of zero values. In order to select the best
ﬁtting approach for our countmodel we carried out an extensive analysis
of the data. First, we took account of the general caution to adopt an OLS
regression in count data. As shown in the histogramdepicted in Fig. 1, our
dependent variable is strongly skewed to the right, so clearly OLS regres-
sion would be inappropriate.
Second, count data often follow a Poisson distribution, but since over-
dispersion is a possible problem with Poisson regression (Hausman et al.
1984), we conducted tests to assess over-dispersion for the basic Poisson
speciﬁcation (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998). We tested the Poisson as-
sumption (equality of mean and variance) against the negative binomial
model, by using the “gof” command powered by STATA software
that tests the Poisson goodness-of-ﬁt. We obtained small value for
chi-square in the “gof”, meaning that the Poisson distribution is a good
choice.We tested eachmodel reported in Table 2 and all models exhibit
a non-signiﬁcant over-dispersion. We have double-checked our results
by using a negative binomial estimator to ﬁt the new product models,
which accommodates over-dispersed data. Using negative binomial re-
gression (robust standard errors), all variables retain the same sign and
the same signiﬁcance.
In addition, we also checked for the percentage of data points of the
dependent variable that take the value 0, and this percentage is quite
high (85%). Theory suggests that a separate process from the count
values could generate the excess zeros, so the excess zeros should be
modeled independently. In our context the only phenomenon that
could generate a separate process is the industry effect. Indeed, since
both pharmaceutical and biotechnological companies constitute our
sample, it should be possible that several biotech companies do not de-
velop products in the time horizon (since for example they are focused
on developing new patents). Thus, in order to strengthen the choice of
the Poisson model, we also run the Zero-Inﬂated Poisson (ZIP) model.
We excluded the zero-inﬂated negative binomial regression model
since from the previous poisson goodness of ﬁt test we found that
Poisson speciﬁcation has a better model ﬁt than the negative binomial
speciﬁcation. We test the zero-inﬂated model versus the standard
Poisson model by using the “vuong” command powered by STATA soft-
ware. We gained a non-signiﬁcant z-test, meaning that the Poisson
model is better.
Finally, as a further robustness check we ran a Probit regression
by using the dichotomized variable of the dependent variable New
Products. Also this model conﬁrms the Poisson results. Thus, following
the results of the previous tests (gof and vuong), we can conclude in
favor of the Poisson speciﬁcation.
5. Results
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and the correlationmatrix of
all the different variables. The correlation matrix shows that all variables
have values of correlation, which should not raise multicollinearity prob-
lems among the variables. We controlled for multicollinearity problems
among variables by calculating the VIF (variance inﬂation factor) a more
advanced measure of multicollinearity than simple correlations
(Stevens, 1992). As shown in Table 1, all the VIF values are below the crit-
ical level, indicating that the explanatory variables can simultaneously be
included in the models (Gujarati, 1995). Finally, we also control for
heteroskedasticity problems. Running the White test (White, 1980) for
detecting heteroskedasticity we assessed that our data experience
heteroskedasticity problems, that we have corrected using the robust
standard error when running the regressions.
Table 2 provides an overview of the results of Poisson regression
analysis. We used hierarchical entry of the independent variables in the
regression models. Model 1, in Table 2, is a base model in which only
the controls were included. Inmodel 2 we introduced the inter-ﬁrm net-
work positionmeasure eigenvector centrality (Eigen),while inModel 3we
introduced the board eigenvector centrality (Interlock_Eigen) of each
ﬁrm. The fourth model shows the results of the ﬁrst two-way interaction
term, i.e. Eigen × Interlock_Eigen.
In model 5 we introduced the second inter-ﬁrm network position
structural holes (Str_holes). In model 6 we included both structural holes
(Str_holes) variable and board eigenvector centrality (Interlock_Eigen),
while in the seventh model we introduced the second two-way interac-
tion term, i.e. Str_holes × Interlock_Eigen. In model 8 we entered both
the inter-ﬁrm network variables, while in model 9 we entered both the
inter-ﬁrm network variables and the board eigenvector centrality vari-
able. Finally, in model 10 we reported the results when all the variables
and the two interaction terms are entered simultaneously.
Since the interaction term may be highly correlated with the ﬁrst-
order predictor variable fromwhich it is derived, to create all the inter-
action itemswemean-centered theﬁrst-order variables Eigen, Str_holes,
Interlock_Eigen to reduce any potential multicollinearity (Little et al.,
2006). Considering the overall ﬁt of each model, we observed that the
introduction of the inter-ﬁrm network measures signiﬁcantly improves
theﬁt. Another signiﬁcant improvement occurswith the introduction of
the two interaction effects (see Table 2 below).
The analysis of the results of the control variables in model 1 shows
that R&D expenditures variable has a positive and signiﬁcant effect on the
number of new biopharmaceutical products introduced in the market.
The coefﬁcient of the variable size is statistically signiﬁcant only in the
full model 10, so no signiﬁcant contribution derives from this variableFig. 1. New Products variable distribution.
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on the dependent one. The nationality variable is negative and signiﬁcant;
thus US ﬁrms develop more biotech products. Finally, the coefﬁcient of
patent stock is signiﬁcant and negative, meaning that companies in this
sector seem to specialize in developing and selling patents and may
neglect the development of new biopharmaceutical products.
As shown inmodel 2 of Table 2, the variable Eigen has a positive and
statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcient. This result is in line with past
research that also found that a centrally located ﬁrm in its inter-ﬁrm
network develops more new products. Similarly, in model 5, the vari-
able Str_holes is positive though weakly statistically signiﬁcant. The
board centrality measure, Interlock_Eigen, is signiﬁcant and positively
related to NPD as shown in both model 3 and model 6 of Table 2. This
conﬁrms that a board that is highly connected in the interlocking direc-
torate network increases the likelihood to develop new products
(Wincent et al., 2010).
RegardingH1,we expected apositive interaction effect between inter-
ﬁrmnetwork centrality and board interlock network centrality. As shown
in model 4, Table 2, the interaction term (Eigen × Interlock_Eigen) is
positive and strongly signiﬁcant as expected and so H1 is conﬁrmed. For
H2we predicted a positive interaction effect between inter-ﬁrm structur-
al hole position and board interlock centrality. As shown in model 5,
Table 2, the interaction term (Str_holes × Interlock_Eigen) is positive and
signiﬁcant, thus conﬁrming H2. Finally, when we added simultaneously
all the interaction terms in model 10, only the interaction term Eigen ×
Interlock_Eigen remained signiﬁcant and positive.
In addition, as also suggested by Jaccard and Turrisi (2003), to pro-
vide evenmore interesting insights on themagnitude of themoderation
effects we carried out a deeper analysis whose results are shown as
plots in Fig. 2a and b.
Fig. 2a plots the effect of the interaction on predicted values of new
products of eigenvector centrality and interlock eigenvector centrality.
In line with Schilling and Phelps (2007), the “Low Interlock_Eigen”
line shows the slope of the effect of Eigen on New Products when the
value of Interlock_Eigen is set to one standard deviation below its
mean. The “High Interlock_Eigen” line represents the effect of Eigen on
New Products when the value of Interlock_Eigen is set to one standard
Table 1
Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix.
Mean SD Min Max (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) VIF
1. New products 0.27 0.91 0 11 1.00
2. Patent stock 120.11 430.81 0 3359 0.40* 1.00 1.58
3. Size 4.48 2.43 0.28 11.5 0.28* 0.47⁎ 1.00 1.97
4. R&D expenditures 3.17 1.76 0 9.01 0.35* 0.49⁎ 0.67⁎ 1.00 2.02
5. Industry 0.61 0.48 0 1 −0.01 0.06 0.11 0.07 1.00 1.13
6. Nationality 0.36 0.48 0 1 −0.09 −0.06 −0.04 −0.06 −0.12⁎ 1.00 1.02
7. Eigen 1.75 4.52 0 47.1 0.52* 0.31⁎ 0.23⁎ 0.25 −0.19⁎ −0.01 1.00 1.32
8. Str_holes 0.46 0.33 0 1 0.18* 0.17⁎ 0.16⁎ 0.21 −0.22⁎ 0.02 0.35⁎ 1.00 1.22
9. Interlock_Eigen 0.22 0.65 0 5.11 0.37* 0.43⁎ 0.32⁎ 0.32 0.02 −0.07 0.29⁎ 0.15⁎ 1.00 1.31
⁎ p b 0.05.
Table 2
Results of the Poisson analysis.
New products
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Patent stock 0.000138
(0.000224)
−0.000225
(0.000163)
−0.000463⁎
(0.000207)
−0.000495⁎
(0.000215)
0.0000478
(0.000228)
−0.000134
(0.000245)
−0.000175
(0.000169)
−0.000260†
(0.000157)
−0.000464⁎
(0.000197)
−0.000504⁎⁎
(0.000175)
Size −0.0819
(0.189)
0.0331
(0.174)
−0.0247
(0.106)
−0.134
(0.0822)
−0.0702
(0.198)
−0.103
(0.160)
−0.125
(0.0837)
0.0360
(0.176)
−0.0165
(0.108)
−0.144†
(0.0807)
R&D expenditures 0.660⁎
(0.320)
0.481†
(0.297)
0.539⁎⁎
(0.186)
0.799***
(0.159)
0.624†
(0.337)
0.633⁎
(0.289)
0.679***
(0.125)
0.470
(0.303)
0.521⁎⁎
(0.190)
0.812***
(0.145)
Industry −0.290
(0.362)
0.401
(0.407)
0.322
(0.385)
0.258
(0.374)
−0.0494
(0.349)
−0.160
(0.371)
0.00840
(0.293)
0.536
(0.380)
0.420
(0.370)
0.396
(0.347)
Nationality −0.838⁎
(0.369)
−0.668†
(0.349)
−0.601†
(0.334)
−0.764⁎
(0.378)
−0.711⁎
(0.345)
−0.634†
(0.335)
−0.443
(0.340)
−0.631†
(0.333)
−0.584†
(0.325)
−0.639†
(0.362)
Eigen 0.0582⁎⁎
(0.0188)
0.0566***
(0.0153)
−0.0145
(0.0254)
0.0533⁎⁎
(0.0181)
0.0528***
(0.0152)
−0.0167
(0.0232)
Interlock_Eigen 0.454***
(0.137)
0.279⁎
(0.119)
0.396⁎
(0.179)
−0.800
(0.634)
0.416⁎⁎
(0.137)
−0.117
(0.306)
Eigen × Interlock_Eigen 0.125***
(0.0320)
0.108⁎⁎
(0.0331)
Str_holes 1.170⁎
(0.556)
0.984†
(0.535)
1.027†
(0.588)
0.889†
(0.500)
0.657
(0.494)
0.887†
(0.490)
Str_holes × Interlock_Eigen 0.747⁎
(0.344)
0.241
(0.193)
Constant −3.276***
(0.625)
−3.738***
(0.513)
−3.809***
(0.479)
−4.073***
(0.419)
−4.009***
(0.654)
−3.862***
(0.679)
−3.996***
(0.586)
−4.282***
(0.592)
−4.182***
(0.585)
−4.605***
(0.544)
N 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300
Wald chi2 69.63 547.80 478.48 539.35 87.23 95.12 116.52 447.56 403.71 526.51
Log pseudolikelihood −168.96 −158.37 −150.41 −143.52 −164.60 −158.26 −147.67 −155.83 −149.10 −139.601
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
† p b 0.10.
⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.001.
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deviation above its mean. Finally, the “Medium Interlock_Eigen” line is
the effect of Eigen on New Productswhen the value of Interlock_Eigen is
set to itsmean.Moreover, the endpoints of the three lines are calculated
at one standard deviation below (Low Eig) and above (High Eig) the
mean of eigenvector centrality. Consistent with the results in Model 4
of Table 2, the plot of Fig. 1b suggests that a high level of eigenvector
centrality in the inter-ﬁrm networks should be accompanied by a high
level of eigenvector centrality in the interlocking directorate networks,
if the objective is to accelerate the effect of ﬁrm's eigenvector centrality
on the propensity to develop new products. Fig. 2b plots the effect of
Structural holes on the predicted values of new products for the same
three values of interlocking eigenvector centrality calculated as before.
Also for this plot, the end points of the lines are calculated at one stan-
dard deviation below (Low Hl) and above (High Hl) the mean of struc-
tural holes. Consistent with the results in Model 7 of Table 2, the plot of
Fig. 1b shows how combining a high degree of structural holes in inter-
ﬁrm network and a high level of interlocking eigenvector centrality
increases the propensity to develop new products. We can conclude
that the strength of the relationships (i.e. increased slope of the plots)
between new product development and eigenvector centrality and
new product development and structural holes are greater when
Interlock_Eigen is high. In other words, Interlock_Eigen strengthens
these relationships.
6. Discussions and conclusion
The present study adds to a recent trend in SC research that seeks to
investigate how and why business outcomes are achieved through
multiple networks (Ozmel et al, 2013; Wang et al., 2014). We do this
by studying how inter-personal networks interact with inter-ﬁrm net-
works to achieve innovation outcomes of new product development.
In particular, our study focused on how prominence in the directors' in-
terlock network relates to information sourced fromdifferent inter-ﬁrm
network positions, a mechanism that has not been explored so far in
past studies. Our study explains why and how this interaction exists
and the empirical analysis indicates that this interaction is useful for
effective NPD.
Indeed, this is the subject of the hypotheses developed in the
study—H1 and H2. Concerning H1, we found that prominent boards
channel potentially valuable information tomitigate drawbacks experi-
enced by prominent ﬁrms in inter-ﬁrm networks and in this way posi-
tively accelerate the ability to develop new products. Themodel results,
strengthened by analysis depicted in Fig. 2a, seem to support our argu-
ment that a prominent board ﬁlters information ﬂowing through the
inter-ﬁrm network for its suitability, reliability and quality and does
so cost effectively. Furthermore, the board itself is a source of valuable
information and can ﬁll in information gaps reducing any overspeciali-
zation risk related with prominent positions in the inter-ﬁrm network.
The second hypothesis (H2) predicted a positive interaction effect
between a prominent board and the structural hole position of the
ﬁrm in its inter-ﬁrm network. The results conﬁrmed H2 and graphical
illustrations in Fig. 2b also showed a noticeable link between prominent
boards (high levels of board eigenvector centrality) andﬁrm's structural
hole position in the inter-ﬁrm network in accelerating NPD. The results
support our intuition that, a prominent board plays a complementary
and counteracting role when the ﬁrm exploits information from its
structural hole position. A prominent board ﬁlls in information volume
gaps in cases where the ego ﬁrm is rich in diverse information from its
structural hole position in the network of inter-ﬁrm ties but has no
sufﬁcient internal knowledge depth to dealwith such external diversity.
In addition, a prominent board helps managers to reduce the informa-
tion asymmetry embedded in diverse information, helping in this way
to reduce the risk of processing diverse information provided by the
structural hole position of the ﬁrm.
Furthermore, our results conﬁrm the recent ﬁndings about the impact
of prominent and structural hole positions in the inter-ﬁrm network on
NPD. First, we ﬁnd a positive impact of prominent position on NPD in
line with recent ﬁndings obtained by Mazzola et al. (2015). Second, we
also obtain conﬁrmation of the positive impact of bridging structural
holes in the inter-ﬁrm network on NPD. This is also in line with the
theoretical framework of Mazzola et al. (2015), even though the authors
do not obtain an empirical conﬁrmation for their hypothesis. Thus, our
results reinforce those of studies that have recently attempted to in-
vestigate the impact of some inter-ﬁrm network positions to NPD
performance.
Moreover, this study offers important managerial implications. First,
in linewith previous studies (Wincent et al., 2010;Mazzola et al., 2015),
we conﬁrm the importance of networking positioning, both in the inter-
lock directorates and inter-ﬁrm networks, for improving ﬁrm's perfor-
mance such as NPD. Furthermore, our results seem to indicate that
having prominent directors within the board is beneﬁcial for prominent
ﬁrms.What our study shows is that a prominent board is evenmore im-
portant when the ﬁrm also has prominence in the network of inter-ﬁrm
ties. A prominent board's role then includes a counteracting one to mit-
igate possible drawbacks the ﬁrm encounters as the ﬁrm accumulates
more strategic resources via its growing network. The implication is
that ﬁrms have to consider carefully board compositions with regard
to the total board capital available, including social capital that considers
the depth and breadth of the ﬁrm's interlocking directorate network
(Haynes and Hillman, 2010). Furthermore, we have discussed how
Fig. 2. (a) Effect of Interlock_Eigen and Eigen on new product development. (b) Effect of Interlock_Eigen and Str_holes on new product development.
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interlock directorate and inter-ﬁrm networks involve persons at differ-
ent levels of hierarchy and hence possibly also different source of infor-
mation. From a managerial perspective this means that ﬁrms who are
able to better integrate directors and product managers' knowledge
gain more advantage in terms of NPD performance. Thus, even if our
work is not focused on analyzing the process through which ﬁrms inte-
grate board interlock network information with inter-ﬁrm network in-
formation, it highlights the managerial importance of establishing such
integration processes in the ﬁrm. Some other interesting managerial im-
plications come from the analysis of the result of the control variables. In-
deed, our results conﬁrm that in the biopharmaceutical industry ﬁrms
who specialize on patent production tend to sell them as intermediate
products and therefore they may neglect to develop new products
(Phelps, 2010).
A further consideration concerns the interesting research ﬁeld
opened by the present study, i.e. the analysis of the interactions
between inter-ﬁrm and inter-personal networks. There are several in-
teresting issues that could be further investigated along this direction.
One future research direction could be to evaluate the impact of the
above interaction on other forms of ﬁrm performance; another path of
investigation would be the analysis of the moderating role of each
director's network on the relationship between inter-ﬁrm network po-
sition and innovation performance.
Finally, an additional interesting source of further investigation
arises from the comparison of the magnitude and signiﬁcance of the
two interaction effects. Comparing Fig. 2a and b, it becomes apparent
that the inﬂuence of a prominent board is much stronger on prominent
positions of the ﬁrm than on the structural hole ones. The analysis of the
levels of signiﬁcance in model 10 also shows that the interaction term
Str_holes × Interlock_Eigen is no longer signiﬁcant. Although this result
may arise from the differences in impact of inter-ﬁrm eigenvector and
structural holes on the NPD, as clearly shown in model 8 (where both
Eigen and Str_holes are signiﬁcant, but the ﬁrst has a stronger level of
signiﬁcance), the result is quite unexpected. This result is surprising
because, according to our theorizing a prominent board that interacts
an inter-ﬁrm structural hole position has a double effect on the NPD
performance, i.e. counteracting possible drawback of the inter-ﬁrm
structural holes feature and a complementary role. Thus, this result
merits further investigations which may involve the measurement of
actual inter-tie ﬂows.
Like all studies, this one has several limitations that further research
should overcome. Firstly, network theory runs the risk of confusing
network positions themselves as beneﬁts and not as sources of beneﬁts
to focal ﬁrms (Koka and Prescott, 2002). This is because most network
studies do not measure the actual beneﬁts of network positions i.e. in-
formation or knowledge or resource ﬂows. This is a major weakness in
network literature. Although our study does not measure information
ﬂows, wemove forward network research by empirically validating hy-
pothesized ﬂows of information beneﬁts and how they may interact in
product development. However, a deeper stage of investigation could
concern how the interaction of the two ﬂows of information actually
happens in the ﬁrm. This would imply a survey analysis to understand
how board directors and management exchange information coming
from their respective networks.
A second limitation is relevant to the innovation performance mea-
surewe have used. Indeed, researchers often capture innovation perfor-
mance with different innovation outcomes such as new developed
products, number of patents and patent citations. In this paper we
adopted only a NPD perspective to verify our theoretical framework.
Thus, the interpretation of the results can be different in cases where
other innovationmeasures are employed.Moreover, the same potential
problem of misspeciﬁcation may exist since we do not consider other
perspectives of SC. In this work we addressed only one dimension of
SC, i.e. structural embeddedness (measured as centrality and structural
holes) and we have neglected the relational embeddedness dimension
of SC—that is empirically also recognized as a signiﬁcant inﬂuence of
the ﬁrm's performance (Gulati, 1995; Soh, 2003). Finally, this study
focuses on biopharmaceutical companies. Although the context is surely
appropriate for the issues under investigations, it would be unwise to
generalize the ﬁndings too broadly to other industries.
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